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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, as international trade and interstate commerce merely con-
sist of internet transactions from laptops and smartphones, the funda-
mental policies behind federal admiralty law have seemingly vanished
* Kathryn D. Yankowski, J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Miami School of Law. B.A.
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into the horizon. It is well-accepted that the creation of admiralty law
stemmed from the demands of commerce and the desires of merchants
to broaden their horizons.' As voyages transitioned from horseback to
the high seas, the law was forced to take special precautions to protect
and facilitate the unique nature of maritime exchange. The Constitution
reserves cases of maritime and admiralty jurisdiction to the federal judi-
ciary and grants Congress the power to enact a body of uniform, federal
law to govern such affairs.2 In a practical sense, admiralty law is an
outgrowth of the expansion of trade and the necessities of nautical
transit; as such, non-commercial uses of vessels were considered irrele-
vant in the shaping and scope of early admiralty law.
3
However, with traditional wooden schooners becoming obsolete,
commercial maritime concerns are becoming less of a concern for
lawmakers and courts.4 The recent growth of recreational and residential
uses of boats and vessels has injected new uncertainties in admiralty
jurisprudence: What nautical laws still remain relevant in light of the
shift from commercial to recreational use, and to what types of innova-
tive structures should these laws apply? This Note focuses on one of the
most controversial categories within "new" maritime innovation: the
floating home.
The United States has seen the presence of floating homes since the
early 1900s.5 The concept of floating home communities took shape dur-
ing the Great Depression, when the cost of materials for floating homes
was substantially less than the price of building or purchasing a house on
land.6 The country also saw an increase in the popularity of floating
homes during the 1960s when the liberal, Bohemian lifestyle was preva-
lent in society.7 As of today, there are over 5,000 individuals and fami-
lies occupying floating homes around the United States, with well over
2,000 floating home owners residing atop water in Portland, Oregon
alone.8 For this significant portion of the American population, the ques-
tions of whether they must abide by state law or whether federal mari-
1. ROBERT M. HUGHES, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW § 5 (2d ed. 1920).
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2
3. Michael F. Vitt, Stemming the Tide: Uniformity in Admiralty Commands No Recovery for
Recreational Vessel Losses Under a Marine Products Liability Theory in Maryland Courts Due to
the Economic Loss Rule of East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 28 U. BALT.
L. REV. 423, 429 (1999).
4. Id. at 444.
5. Vicki Gornall, The Search for a House in Seattle, WicKED HOUSE OF THE EAST (Oct. 28
2012, 11:32 PM), http://wickedhouseoftheeast.blogspot.com/2012/10/we-have-house.htm.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Brief for the Seattle Floating Homes Association and the Floating Homes Association of
Sausalito as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133
S. Ct. 735 (2013) (No. 11-626).
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time statutes preempted those regulations remained issues of great
debate among the courts.
Local and state legislatures have taken active steps in developing a
workable code of laws and regulations that apply specifically to floating
homes.9 However, because these homes are on top of navigable waters
and are physically capable of being towed across the high seas, there
was a valid argument that such structures fall under maritime law and
are therefore governed by federal admiralty statutes. The term "vessel"
is defined in Section 3 of the U.S. Code as "every description of water-
craft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a
means of transportation on water."'" This definition is the threshold
question that courts must answer before applying any federal law affect-
ing vessels to a particular watercraft. The caselaw that developed since
Section 3's enactment has helped refine that broad definition into a more
useable standard.
This Note provides a comprehensive overview of Section 3's place
in admiralty law, from its codification in the late nineteenth century,
throughout its evolution over the generations, leading to the Supreme
Court's 2013 decision in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., that
floating homes are not "vessels" as contemplated by federal statutes."
Part II of this Note begins by introducing the parties and establishing the
history involved in Lozman, a case that decided the question of whether
a Florida resident's floating home was a vessel subject to admiralty laws
and federal jurisdiction. Historical case law and subsequent evaluations
of maritime precedent, upon which both the Lozman Court and the par-
ties relied, is detailed in Part III. This Note dissects the Lozman opinion
in Part IV, discussing the Court's reasoning for why it held that the
floating home was not a "vessel" for jurisdictional purposes under Sec-
tion 3. Part V then provides an analysis of the decision, examining the
way the Court utilized precedent and incorporated traditional admiralty
law tests. Lastly, Part VI lays out various policy concerns existing in the
underpinnings of admiralty and property law that point in favor of the
Supreme Court's decision to exclude floating homes from federal
regulation.
9. Id. at 23.
10. 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
11. 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013).
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II. EVENTS LEADING TO CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH V. THAT CERTAIN
UNNAMED GRAY, Two-STORY VESSEL APPROXIMATELY
FIFTY-SEVEN FEET IN LENGTH
A. Background and Facts of Lozman's Floating Home
Fane Lozman ("Lozman"), a vocal financial software entrepreneur
and former Marine pilot, accomplished great success throughout his
career and can now add a Supreme Court victory to his resume.12 In
2002, Lozman bought a floating home from its original owner and con-
structer. 13 It was affixed to the seawall adjacent to the owner's Fort
Myers, Florida backyard and essentially served as a guesthouse.1 4 The
plywood structure, now coined as "That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two-
Story Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length," complied with
Florida's State building code for land-based dwellings, encompassing all
the typical features of a common home: A rigid rectangular shape, a flat
bottom, French doors lining three sides, a fully functional kitchen and
dinette, a living room, three bedrooms, an upstairs office, a full bath, and
a sundeck.
15
Lozman's floating residence was equipped with a land-based sew-
age connection, just as any similar home on land would be.16 And
although floating atop water, the home lacked any means of self-propul-
sion, steering, or navigation for easy water transit.1 7 There were no life-
boats, marine safety equipment, towing cleats, batteries, or generators on
board.18 The structure neither qualified for vessel certification by the
United States Coast Guard nor met the State's standards for vessel
registration. 19
To facilitate the 200-mile transport of the floating home from Fort
Myers to Lozman's final destination in North Bay Village, Florida,2°
12. Matt Krantz, High Court to Hear Trader's Floating Home Case, USA TODAY (Oct. 1,
2012, 9:10 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2012/09/30/eminent-
domain-houseboat/1580789.
13. Telephone Interview with Fane Lozman, owner of the floating home (Jan. 14, 2013)
[hereinafter Lozman Interview].
14. Id.
15. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013)
(No. 11-626) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
16. Id.
17. Id. at 4.
18. Id.
19. Id. A Hull Identification Number is required for a craft to be legally recognized as a
documented vessel by Florida and the United States Coast Guard. See FLA. STAT. § 328.07
(2011); see also 33 C.F.R. § 181.29 (2012). Therefore, Lozman would not have been able to
independently travel over water in his floating home under the parameters of local and federal
laws. Lozman Interview, supra note 13.
20. Brief for Respondent at 5, Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013)
(No. 11-626) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
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Lozman had to screw temporary cleats into the structure to enable a
tow. 21 After the trip, Lozman comfortably resided in a North Bay Vil-
lage floating neighborhood, along with approximately fifty other float-
ing homes, for three uninterrupted years.22 However, Hurricane Wilma
destroyed the seaside community in 2005, forcing Lozman to relocate
his unharmed home sixty miles, again by towboat, to the Riviera Beach
Marina (the "Marina"). 23 Lozman implemented more extensive prepara-
tions for this journey; he hired a contractor to install new tow cleats and
arranged a motorboat tow in the front and an additional towboat in the
back of the home to prevent it from "jackknifing" during transit.
24
The Marina is a public facility that is owned and operated by the
City of Riviera Beach, Florida (the "City").2 5 In March 2006, Lozman
entered into a month-by-month agreement with the Marina, whereby the
Marina supplied a slip for Lozman's floating home in exchange for a
monthly dockage fee.26 According to Lozman, the Marina was initially
very welcoming to him and his floating home: Lozman provided the
facility with steady income and the houseboat utilized an essentially
unusable slip for most other watercrafts. 27 Because Lozman's houseboat
only required approximately twelve inches of water to safely moor, his
dockage slip would not have been suitable for most other moored crafts
and would not have been able to generate profit.28
From its slip, the floating home was connected to municipal water
and was hooked up to shore-based utilities such as electrical power,
cable television, internet, and telephone.2 9 Lozman also successfully
filed for Florida Homestead Exemption on his floating residence at the
Marina with the county's Property Appraiser.3"
Despite their copasetic business exchange, Lozman and the Marina
quickly fell into a heated legal battle. Within months of moving to the
Marina, Lozman learned of the City's multi-billion dollar agreement
with a private contractor to redevelop the Marina into a mega-yacht
center.31 Lozman, a passionate local-activist, promptly brought suit
21. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 15, at 4.
22. Lozman Interview, supra note 13.
23. Id.
24. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 15, at 6.
25. Respondent's Brief, supra note 20.
26. Id.
27. Lozman Interview, supra note 13.
28. Id.
29. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 15, at 6. Although the structure was equipped to do so,
Lozman could not connect his home to land-based sewage because the Marina's sewage
infrastructure was deteriorated. Id.
30. Lozman Interview, supra note 13.
31. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 15, at 6.
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against the City in state court, claiming that the City's deal violated
Florida law by not giving the public proper advance notice.32 Shortly
thereafter, the redevelopment plan was abandoned, suit was dropped,
and Lozman was credited with successfully blocking the billion-dollar
deal.
B. State Eviction Suit
The City of Riviera Beach, still feeling the effects of the lost deal,
sought to evict Lozman from his floating home for failing to muzzle his
ten-pound dachshund and for hiring unlicensed repairmen to work on his
residence.34 On August 9, 2006, the City filed suit in state court in Palm
Beach County and sent Lozman an eviction notice. 35 The City urged the
court to apply state landlord-tenant statutes to the case because its con-
tract with Lozman created a nonresidential tenancy under Florida law.3 6
The circuit court agreed and applied Florida state landlord-tenant law.3 7
Following a three-day trial, where Lozman zealously represented him-
self,38 a jury found in favor of Lozman, determining that Lozman's prior
efforts to block the redevelopment plan was a "motivating or substantial
factor" in the City's retaliatory action to terminate his lease.39
C. Admiralty Suit in Federal Court
Lozman's victory in the eviction suit was cut short when the
Riviera Beach City Council unanimously passed revisions to the
Marina's Rules and Regulations. n° The new provisions in the Rules
demanded that all structures at the facility obtain certain liability insur-
ance, produce proof of vessel registration, comply with the Florida
Clean Vessel Act, and be "operational and capable of vacating the
marina in the case of an emergency.' Within an approximately eigh-
teen-month period, the Marina allegedly sent Lozman a total of three
noncompliance notices, only one of which he claims he received.42
As of April 1, 2009-the deadline to execute the updated agree-
ment-Lozman neither executed the agreement nor complied with its
32. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 15, at 7.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two-Story Vessel Approximately
Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d 1259, 1263 (1 1th Cir. 2011).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 15, at 7.
39. Riviera Beach, 648 F.3d at 1263.
40. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 15, at 7.
41. Riviera Beach, 649 F.3d at 1263.
42. Id.
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provisions. On April 20, 2009, the City filed an in rem suit against the
floating home in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida.43 The City sought to foreclose its maritime lien on
Lozman's structure for purported unpaid dockage totaling approximately
$3,000.4 The Marina also sought damages through a trespass claim
against the floating home.45
The City's jurisdictional and substantive hook for getting into fed-
eral court lies at the heart of the entire case: the Federal Maritime Lien
Act ("FMLA") provides that:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of the section, a person pro-
viding necessaries to a vessel on the order of the owner or a person
authorized by the owner - (1) has a maritime lien on the vessel; (2)
may bring a civil action in rem to enforce the lien; and (3) is not
required to allege or prove in the action that credit was given to the
vessel. (b) This section does not apply to a public vessel.46
Asserting that Lozman's floating home constituted a "vessel" allowed
the City's claims to be governed by FMLA, thus invoking the exclusive
and original admiralty jurisdiction of the federal court.4 7
The same day the suit was filed, the federal court issued a warrant
for the arrest of the home pursuant to Supplemental Rule C for Certain
Maritime and Admiralty Claims.4 8 Within hours of its issuance, U.S.
Marshals executed the warrant and towed the floating home eighty miles
south to Miami, Florida.49 One day later, Lozman filed an emergency
motion to dismiss the complaint and return his home to the Marina.5 °
The district court denied Lozman's request just a few days later.51
After a brief bench trial, the district court issued an order of final
judgment against Lozman on January 6, 2010.52 The court found that the
defendant floating home was indeed a "vessel" subject to federal juris-
diction (thus, subject to the maritime lien imposed by FMLA), and that
the vessel was liable to the Marina for over $3,000 in back dockage and
43. Id. at 1264.
44. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 15, at 8. According to Lozman, he timely paid his dockage
rent to the Marina. Lozman argues that, essentially, the Marina created its own maritime lien by
not accounting for and processing his checks. Lozman Interview, supra note 13.
45. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 15, at 8.
46. 46 U.S.C. § 31342 (2006) (emphasis added).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006).
48. Riviera Beach, 649 F.3d at 1264. "If the conditions for an in rem action appear to exist,
the court must issue an order directing the clerk to issue a warrant for the arrest of the vessel or
other property that is the subject of the action." FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. C(3)(a)(i).
49. Respondent's Brief, supra note 20, at 9.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Riviera Beach, 649 F.3d at 1265.
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$1 in nominal damages from its trespass.53 The district court ordered the
U.S. Marshal to release the watercraft and execute its sale to satisfy the
final judgment against it.
54
In March 2010, the City purchased Lozman's sole residence at pub-
lic auction in Miami,55 where it was then, in the words of Justice Ken-
nedy, "mercifully destroyed" by the City.5 6 The destruction entailed a
five-week dismantlement of the structure, board by board, nail by nail.57
Lozman could only watch from the street as each piece of his home and
various personal belongings were scrapped or recycled. 8 Although his
home could not be salvaged, Lozman continued to fight for his rights
against the City by appealing the case to the Highest Court.59
IlK. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS AND PRECEDENT ON "VESSEL"
UNDER 1 U.S.C. § 3
A. Early Admiralty Treatise and Case Law
Dating back to its nineteenth century inception into admiralty law,
Section 3 of the Rules of Construction Act has been narrowly interpreted
by authorities, tying "vessel" status to the craft's particular purpose of
design. The default definition of "vessel," as codified in Section 3, states
that a vessel "includes every description of watercraft or other artificial
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation
on water."60 This open-ended definition applies to every U.S. Code pro-
vision that includes the word "vessel," "unless the context indicates oth-
erwise. '61 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that this definition,
which has remained substantially unaltered from its original codification
in 1873, was not meant to modify existing admiralty jurisprudence, but
was instead meant to solidify the meaning acquired in general maritime
law.
62
One of the top respected admiralty treatises published during the




56. Oral Argument at 4:53, Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013) (No.
11-626), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012-11 626.
57. Lozman Interview, supra note 13.
58. Id. The City spent a total of $6,900 of taxpayer money on the deconstruction of Lozman's
house. Id.
59. Id.
60. 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
61. Id. at § 1 (2006).
62. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 489-91 (2005) (citing treatises and admiralty
decisions from the late nineteenth century that discuss the historical context of the statutory
definition of "vessel").
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dict on Admiralty.63 It established a guiding principle for discerning the
significance of "vessel" within general admiralty law: "It is not the form,
the construction, the rig, the equipment, or the means of propulsion that
establishes the jurisdiction, but the purpose and business of the craft, as
an instrument of naval transportation."'  Benedict also asserted that
"vessel" and "ship" are equivalent terms within maritime law and that a
"ship" is defined as "a locomotive machine adapted to transportation
over rivers, seas, and oceans."65 As such, Benedict considered vessel
determination dependent on the structure's purpose of design relative to
its water transit function.66 Benedict's legal theories reveal that, from
early on, admiralty law has ranked the aquatic function of a structure
superior to its mere physical capabilities and attributes when establish-
ing vessel status.
During the era of Benedict's treatise, many cases supported his
explanation of vessel status by ignoring the traditional physical attrib-
utes and uncovering the true function(s) of the craft. For example, the
court in The General Cass stated:
The true criterion by which to determine whether any water craft, or
vessel, is subject to admiralty jurisdiction, is the business or employ-
ment for which it is intended, or is susceptible of being used, or in
which it is actually engaged, rather than its size, form, capacity, or
means of propulsion.67
Another early court opinion that relied upon Benedict's purpose-based
inquiry held that "the structure in question, though afloat, is not such a
vessel, because it was not designed or used for the purpose of naviga-
tion, nor engaged in the uses of commerce, nor in the common transpor-
tation of persons or cargo. '"68
In Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., the Supreme Court offered
approval of the purposive test when it looked to the structure's purpose
in deciding whether or not a dry-dock was a vessel.69 The structure in
Cope was a flat-bottomed, box-shaped floating platform that was "per-
manently moored by means of large chains .... -7o With no method of
63. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 15, at 22.
64. ERAsTUs C. BENEDICT, THE AMERICAN ADMiRALTY: ITS JURISDICToON AND PRACTICE
§ 218 (2d ed. 1870).
65. Id. at § 215 (emphasis added).
66. The historical concept of looking to the craft's design in ascertaining its water transit
purpose has also been discussed by Robert Hughes in his 1920 admiralty treatise: "The character
of craft included in the admiralty jurisdiction is [a] . . . structure capable of navigation and
designed for navigation." ROBERT M. HUGHES, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW § 5 (2d ed. 1920).
67. 10 F. Cas. 169, 170 (E.D. Mich. 1871) (No. 5,307).
68. Ruddiman v. A Scow Platform, 38 F. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1889).
69. 119 U.S. 625 (1887).
70. Id. at 627.
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propulsion, the platform was designed to function solely as a means of
removing ships from the water for repairs. 71 Echoing Benedict's purpo-
sive language, the Court held that the dry-dock did not serve a naviga-
tional or water transportation purpose and thus was not a vessel: "The
fact that [the dry-dock] floats on the water does not make it a ship or
vessel. ' 72 The Court's findings in Cope indicate that a function of a
vessel must be more substantially related to practical water transit than
its mere ability to float and hold objects over water.
Early treatises and historically relevant cases show that general
admiralty law paid much attention to a structure's purpose, giving little
weight to exterior features. Therefore, "vessel," as originally codified in
Section 3, was intended to incorporate a purposive or function-based
inquiry that was broadly accepted within maritime law at that time.
B. Twentieth Century Supreme Court Cases Continued the Purpose-
Based Analysis of I U.S.C. § 3
Throughout the 1900s, the Court stayed loyal to admiralty prece-
dent by engaging in a purpose-based inquiry within its vessel analysis.
In its approval of lower courts' applications of Benedict, the Supreme
Court firmly reiterated:
[N]either size, form, equipment, nor means of propulsion are determi-
native factors upon the question of jurisdiction, which regards only
the purpose for which the craft was constructed, and the business in
which it is engaged. The application of this criterion has ruled out the
floating dry dock, the floating wharf, the ferry bridge hinged or
chained to a wharf ....
Among one of the first cases to introduce the term "practically
capable" to the definition of vessel was the bedrock case Evansville &
Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co.7 ' The Supreme
Court held that a wharfboat was not a vessel subject to admiralty limited
liability rules.75 The wharfboat in question, a wooden rectangular struc-
ture on a floating platform, was used as an office, warehouse, and
wharf.7 6 It was attached to land by four or five cables, city water and
electricity wires, and a telephone jack.7 7 Every winter it was towed to a
distant harbor where it was protected from ice damage.78 Despite the
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Perry v. Haines, 191 U.S. 17, 30 (1903).
74. 271 U.S. 19 (1926).
75. Id. at 22.
76. Id. at 21.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 20.
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wharfboat's yearly tow over water, the Court determined that it was not
used to transport cargo from place to place and did not serve a function
that could not have been accomplished on land: "It was not practically
capable of being used as a means of transportation. ' 79 Evansville repre-
sents the Supreme Court's unequivocal acceptance of the purpose-based
test in determining vessel status by writing off infrequent water tows as
incidental and insignificant in relation to the objective "non-maritime"
purpose of the structure.
The purposive test proved to sustain its prevalence within admiralty
jurisprudence in the 1961 Supreme Court case, Roper v. United States.80
This case involved a deactivated World War II ship that was utilized as a
storage facility for the country's surplus grain. 81 "It served as a mobile
warehouse which was filled and then moved out the way to perform its
function of storing grain until needed, at which time it was returned and
unloaded."82 The ship's instruments, gear, and supplies were completely
removed, and the propeller and rudder were fastened in place.83 Differ-
entiating this structure from a common barge, the Court looked to its
true and natural purpose to find that it was not a vessel.84 Following
Evansville, the Court gave little attention to the fact that the structure
was towed over water twice before, and instead noted that the craft per-
formed its function, storing grain, while stationary rather than while
traveling across water.8 The Supreme Court has strategically restricted
Section 3's broad language ("capable of being used") by imposing a
purposive qualification of a craft's practical capability.
C. The Court's Decision in Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co.
The Supreme Court's 2005 unanimous, and oft-cited, decision in
Stewart attempted to clarify the purpose-based approach to vessel sta-
tus.8 6 There, the Court was faced with deciding whether Section 3's defi-
nition of "vessel" encompassed the Super Scoop, a dredge used in the
"Big Dig" to dig trenches beneath Boston Harbor.8 7 The Super Scoop
was a floating platform with limited self-propulsion, moving slowly
across the harbor every few hours.88 To accomplish longer voyages, the
79. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
80. 368 U.S. 20 (1961).
81. Id. at 21.
82. Id. at 22.
83. Id.at 21.
84. Id. at 21-23.
85. Id.
86. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481 (2005). Chief Justice Rehnquist took no part
in the decision.
87. Id. at 484.
88. Id.
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dredge had to be transported by tugboat.89
The Court specifically looked to the dredge's function and purpose
to conclude that the Super Scoop was indeed a vessel under Section 3.90
The opinion cited a vast number of early admiralty cases all agreeing
that dredges, like the Super Scoop, squarely fell under Section 3's defi-
nition of "vessel." 91 Referencing this extensive precedent, the Court
stated that "then, as now, dredges served a waterborne transportation
function, since in performing their work they carried machinery, equip-
ment, and crew over water."'92 In recognizing a widespread and histori-
cal consensus that dredges were "vessels," the Stewart Court followed
tradition and unanimously ruled in accordance.
Although the Court expressly focused on the multiple functions of
the Super Scoop, it articulated that the Section 3 definition of "vessel"
merely demands that the "craft be 'used or capable of being used' for
maritime transportation, not that it be used primarily for that purpose." 93
By declining to consider the predominant function of a waterborne
structure pertinent, in no way did the Court abolish or weaken the gen-
eral purposive test used in traditional vessel analysis. The fact that the
Super Scoop's main objective was to dig trenches, not carry people or
things over water, did not bar it from vessel status.94 Rather, the Court
concluded that the Super Scoop's primary function of digging trenches
was dependent on its ancillary use of transporting crew and equipment
over the Boston Harbor.9 Although the means of propulsion were man-
ual and the distance covered was negligible, the Super Scoop's move-
ment over water was sufficiently relevant to the purpose of the dredge.96
Conversely, if the dredge were not equipped for aquatic transit, digging
trenches along the harbor would be impractical and its primary purpose
would be unfulfilled. 97 Therefore, the Court simply refined the purpo-
sive test, forcing courts to look at the structure's functions holistically
and not base their decisions on one mutually exclusive purpose of the
craft.
In further support of the purpose-based test, Stewart stated that a
structure's use as a means of water transportation must be a "practical
89. Id.
90. See generally id.
91. Id. at 490-91.
92. Id. at 492.
93. Id. at 491 (emphasis added) (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2006)).
94. Id. at 495-96.
95. Id. at 495.
96. Id.
97. Id. "Indeed, it could not have dug the Ted Williams Tunnel had it been unable to traverse
the Boston Harbor, carrying with it workers like Stewart." Id.
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possibility, [not] merely a theoretical one." 98 This qualification narrows
the scope of the phrase "capable of being used" in Section 3. By requir-
ing a structure's use on water to be practical (not merely its floating
ability to be practical), the Court ensures that "vessel" excludes inappro-
priate structures "not commonly thought of as capable of being used for
water transport." 99 In conclusion, Stewart, in accordance with admiralty
precedent, applied common historical understandings and upheld tradi-
tional purpose-based approaches to hold a dredge was a vessel under
Section 3.
D. Eleventh Circuit Decision in City of Riviera Beach v. That
Certain Unnamed Gray, Two-Story Vessel Approximately
Fifty-Seven Feet in Length
Post-Stewart decisions created a distinctive circuit spilt. The Fifth
and Seventh Circuits take the vessel owner's intent into account when
determining if a structure is a vessel. 0 On the other hand, the Eleventh
Circuit completely forecloses any inquiry into a structure's purpose or
its owner's intent, and instead looks broadly to the basic floating and
towing capabilities of a structure.t01
The Eleventh Circuit in City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain
Unnamed Gray, Two-Story Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in
Length followed its Circuit's broad admiralty precedent to find that
Lozman's floating home was a vessel under Section 3, thus subject to
maritime liens and in rem proceedings. 102 In making this determination,
the court set forth the Eleventh Circuit's unambiguous standard for ves-
sel status: "[The] primary inquiry in determining whether a craft is a
vessel is whether the craft was 'rendered practically incapable of
transportation.' "103
The court began by analyzing maritime case law with a review of
Pleason v. Gulfport Shipbuilding Corp."4 and Miami River Boat Yard,
98. Id. at 496.
99. Id. at 494.
100. Compare De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 474 F.3d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 2006)
("Defendants do not intend to use it as [a seagoing vessel]. Rather, their intent is to use it solely as
an indefinitely moored floating casino."), with Tagliere v. Harrah's I11. Corp., 445 F. 3d 1012,
1016 (7th Cir. 2006) (Posner, J.) (contemplating that "maybe-by analogy to the difference
between domicile and residence-a boat is 'permanently' moored when its owner intends that the
boat will never again sail").
101. See Bd. of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist. v. M/V/ BELLE OF ORLEANS, 535 F.3d
1299 (11th Cir. 2008).
102. 649 F.3d 1259, 1269 (11th Cir. 2011).
103. Id. at 1266 (quoting Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d at 1312).
104. 221 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1955).
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Inc. v. 60' Houseboat, Serial #SC-40-2860-3-620 5. In both cases, the
structure in question lacked self-propulsion but was capable of being
towed across water.' 0 6 The court in Pleason reasoned that the gutted and
moored ex-Navy ship turned shrimp processing plant was a vessel
despite its connections to land and bare condition because it was still
afloat, able to be towed, and "capable of being used a means of transpor-
tation." 17 Similarly, the Miami River Boat Yard court found that an
inactive houseboat that served as its owner's residence was a vessel
because "no motive power ... does not deprive her of the status of a
vessel."' 08 Beyond considering the structure's capability of tow despite
self-propulsion, the court also considered the houseboat's tows over
water in its past and expected tows in the near future, implying that the
frequency of planned voyages strengthened its argument for vessel
status.I°9
Using a simplistic "capability of tow" test as fashioned by the Elev-
enth Circuit, and relying heavily on its 2008 Belle of Orleans opinion,
the Riviera court unanimously found Lozman's home to be a vessel
under Section 3."° The court rejected Lozman's first argument that his
floating home was not practically capable of being towed over water
because it sustained considerable damage from previous tows."' The
court reasoned that because the home was actually towed substantial dis-
tances over water "albeit to her detriment," it was at the very least capa-
ble of such transport."
2
Second, Lozman pointed to the fact that the floating home was con-
structed just as any land dwelling would be; it was built from land-based
materials, complied with the State building code, and had more resem-
blance to a regular house than a boat.' 3 Lozman asserted that these facts
showed that the home was not practically capable of maritime transpor-
tation, neither in actuality nor by design."' Nonetheless, the court found
his argument unconvincing because the Belle of Orleans court estab-
lished that vessel status is in no way dependent on the "purpose for
105. 390 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1968).
106. Pleason, 221 F.2d at 623; Miami River Boat Yard, 390 F.2d at 597.
107. 221 F.2d at 622-23.
108. 390 F.2d at 597.
109. Id.
110. City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two-Story Vessel Approximately
Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 694 F.3d 1259 (11 th Cir. 2011).
111. Id. at 1268.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Arguing to this point, Lozman also asserted that the home merely "was designed as a
residence that just happened to float." Id. at 1269.
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which the craft was constructed or its intended use." '
Lastly, Lozman argued that his home did not, and could not, have a
Hull Identification Number or be Coast Guard certified. 16 Therefore,
the home's inability to ever be legally navigable rendered it not practi-
cally capable of being used for water transit.1 17 However, the court again
cited Belle of Orleans and asserted that legal navigability is not the test,
nor even a consideration, for vessel status. 18 Based on the basic premise
that Lozman's floating home could be towed across water, and was
twice before, the Eleventh Circuit found the structure to be a vessel rec-
ognized by federal admiralty law. 19
E. Oral Arguments for the Supreme Court of the United States
Acknowledging a significant gap in the development of admiralty
law, specifically in the determination of vessel status post-Stewart,
among the circuits," ° the Supreme Court agreed to hear Lozman's
appeal of the Eleventh Circuit's ruling.12 ' During oral arguments on
October 1, 2012, one of Lozman's attorneys, Jeffrey Fisher, explained
that vessel status for structures that were never vessels to begin with
(evidenced by their inherent design and function) tums on a function
test. 122 Providing support from the numerous early admiralty cases dis-
cussed above, Fisher urged the Court to focus not solely on the theoreti-
cal capabilities of the structure, as the "capability of tow" test dictates,
but to rather look to its purpose and whether any practical function of
moving people or things across water is served by its common use.
123
Applying that standard to the facts of Riviera, Fisher claimed that
floating homes, like Lozman's, do not serve any purpose when they are
being towed because they cannot be a functional residence when at
sea. 124 Without proper land connections that provide power, utilities and
sewage, and without permanent towing cleats for easy water transit,






120. Compare De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 474 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2006)
(considering the owner's intent and craft's purpose in the analysis), with Bd. of Comm'rs of
Orleans Levee Dist. v. MV/ BELLE OF ORLEANS, 535 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2008)
(disregarding owner intent and only analyzing the craft's actual transit capability).
121. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133 S. Ct. 735, 740 (2013).
122. Oral Argument at 00:35, Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013)
(No. 11-626), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012 1tl626.
123. Id. at 2:25.
124. Id. at 4:30.
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and solely used to be, and therefore is not a vessel under Section 3.125
The City's attorney, David Frederick, proposed a seemingly similar
"practical capability" test. 126 However, the City offered a much more
simplistic version of the test for the Court to apply: Lozman's structure
floats, moves by tow, and carries things/people over water; therefore it is
a vessel.12 7 The Justices countered this rudimentary three-prong
approach with imaginative hypotheticals. If a structure must merely
float, and move, and carry things across water to gain vessel status, what
would prevent an inner tube, 28 pennies pasted on an inner tube,12 9 a
very light cup, 130 a garage door, 13 1 a floating sofa, 32 all from being
"vessels" and swept into federal jurisdiction? The City had a hard time
overcoming the Justices' "de minimis hypotheticals" that satisfy its
basic criteria; it instead focused the Court on Stewart's demand that
practical capability must be viewed in a "real world sense."'133 Implicitly
conceding its own test's vast breadth, the City concluded by arguing the
structure's lack of permanent fixtures to land rendered it a vessel.
134
IV. SUPREME COURT DEciSION IN Lozman v. City of
Riviera Beach, Fla.
A. Holding and Reasoning
The Court issued its opinion on January 15, 2013, answering the
question of whether the floating home fell within Section 3's definition
of "vessel." It ruled in favor of Lozman, holding that his floating home
was not a vessel subject to federal jurisdiction or maritime liens because
"a reasonable observer, looking to the physical characteristics and activi-
ties, would not consider it to be designed to any practical degree for
carrying people or things on water."'
135
The Court explicitly disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit's interpre-
tation of Section 3's phrase "capable of being used ... as a means of
transportation on water."' 136 It found the district court's determination
that Lozman's home was a vessel merely because it was able to float and
125. Id. at 4:40.
126. Id. at 28:19.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 28:30 (Chief Justice Roberts).
129. Id. at 29:12 (Justice Kagan).
130. Id. at 29:03 (Justice Breyer).
131. Id. at 29:07 (Justice Sotomayor).
132. Id. at 33:24 (Justice Breyer).
133. Id. at 29:22.
134. Id. at 49:11.
135. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133 S. Ct. 735, 737 (2013).
136. Id. at 740.
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be towed to be overly broad. 137 The Court recognized that the statute is
not concerned with a structure's capability of tow, but rather its capabil-
ity of being used as a means of transportation on water. 38 Therefore, for
a craft to be considered a "vessel," it must have some purpose of water
transit, yet its physical ability to float has no significant bearing on the
purposive determination.
139
By squaring Evansville with Stewart, the Court concluded that pre-
cedent supported its purposive approach. 4 ' It explained that regardless
of the once-a-year tow, the wharfboat in Evansville was not a vessel
because it was not used to transport people or things over water nor did
it face the "perils of navigation to which craft used for transportation are
exposed."' 4 1 However, the dredge in Stewart, held to be a vessel, simi-
larly lacked self-propulsion and was also only able to travel significant
distances by tow.'42 The Court explained the discrepancy in terms of the
two structures' functions: "[T]he dredge was regularly, but not primarily
used (and designed in part to be used) to transport workers and equip-
ment over water while the wharfboat was not designed (to any practical
degree) to serve a transportation function and did not do so.' 43 Thus,
the Court recognized that the purpose of construct, integrity of design,
and actual use are critical factors that distinguish dredge-like transit ves-
sels from basic floating structures not privy to admiralty jurisdiction.'"
B. Lozman's Introduction of the "Reasonable Observer" Standard
Once the Court established the fundamental criteria for vessel sta-
tus based on its prior holdings, it turned to the objective characteristics
of Lozman's home from a "reasonable observer's" perspective. 45 The
Court considered the home's boxed shape, inability to generate electric-
ity, similarities to land-based residences, and glass windows and doors
to be important indicators of a nonvessel. 46 Despite Perry's enduring
principle that means of propulsion are not dispositive, the Court
regarded the structure's lack of self-propulsion as a "relevant character-
137. Id. "Not every floating structure is a 'vessel."' Id. "We find [the 'anything that floats']
approach inappropriate and inconsistent with our precedent." Id. at 743.
138. Id. at 740.
139. Despite the objects' physical abilities to float and be towed, the Court stated "a wooden
washtub, a plastic dishpan . . . a door taken off its hinges, or Pinocchio (when inside the whale)
are not 'vessels'...." Id.
140. Id. at 742.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 743.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 741.
146. Id.
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istic" in the vessel inquiry. 47 In viewing all of these physical attributes
as a whole, the Court could find "nothing about the home that could lead
a reasonable observer to consider it designed to a practical degree for
'transportation on water.' ,,148
The Court explained that the term "reasonable observer" is an
attempt to eliminate any consideration of the owner's subjective intent in
vessel status determinations.149 Although the Court noted that "it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to determine the use of a human 'contrivance'
without some consideration of human purposes," it believes that vessel
status should not turn on the owner's individual perspective, but rather
on physical characteristics that would show a reasonable observer a
practical purpose of water transportation. 150 A subjective analysis, the
Court stated, is inconsistent with and markedly absent from early admi-
ralty treatises. 51 Therefore, the "reasonable observer" standard keeps
the analysis in line with history's use of an objective purposive test.
C. Lozman's Dissent Also Approves of the Purposive Test
In further disapproval of the Eleventh Circuit's overinclusive vessel
standard, Justice Sotomayor in her dissent, joined by Justice Kennedy,
agreed with the majority in accepting a purpose or function test. 152 How-
ever, the dissent opposed the majority's new formulation of the "reason-
able observer" perspective in determining whether a craft is a vessel.
153
The dissent referenced Evansville and Stewart to support its posi-
tion that the basic standard for vessel status is "any watercraft practically
capable of maritime transportation."' 154 It further described the term
"practically capable" as an objective inquiry that encompasses the obvi-
ous criterion such as ability to float and towing capability.'5 5 Rather than
ending the vessel inquiry with the basic capability question, like the
Eleventh Circuit, the dissent articulated a further step for courts: deter-
mine whether or not a vessel is practically incapable of maritime transit
or permanently moored.'56 Lastly, if these two prongs point toward ves-
sel status, the dissent asserted that a vessel's physical characteristics and
usage history should then be analyzed.'57
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 744.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 745.
152. Id. at 748 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 749.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 751.
157. Id.
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According to the dissent, these three guidelines, firmly rooted in
federal admiralty jurisprudence, make no mention of a "reasonable
observer" standard.158 As such, the dissent rejected the majority's test as
unnecessarily adding a subjective component to vessel analysis. 159 The
dissent further criticized the majority's reliance on the look and feel of
the floating home in comparison to land-based homes. 160 Instead of
employing the "I know it when I see it" test to the physical design of the
structure, as the majority is charged with doing, the dissent would weigh
the craft's objective features as to whether they lend a practical capacity
for maritime transportation.16' Finding the record to be incomplete, the
dissent would have remanded the case for further fact-finding regarding
the home's characteristics and history.
162
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION IN Lozman
A. Lozman's Accurate Application of Stewart
The Court in Lozman correctly interpreted Stewart as a case that
endorsed the purposive test rather than abolished it. Because the Section
3 definition of "vessel" makes no explicit reference to a structure's pur-
pose, design, or function, any test or court that considers such factors
narrows the scope of the statute. Therefore, Stewart's express references
to early precedent and the Super Scoop's specific functions is evidence
of the restricting principles guiding the Court's opinion.
Stewart can easily be read as enlarging vessel status from its expan-
sive language such as, "Section 3 sweeps broadly," and "Section 3
requires only that a watercraft be used or capable ... of transportation
on water."16 3 The Fifth Circuit's De La Rosa opinion offers a clear
example of a court misinterpreting Stewart as extending the scope of




161. Id. at 752.
162. Id. at 754-55.
163. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 495 (2005) (emphasis added).
164. There are numerous federal district court opinions that make the same mistake as De La
Rosa by broadening Stewart beyond its intended application. See, e.g., Holmes v. Atl. Sounding
Co., 437 F.3d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that Stewart "significantly broaden[ed] the set of
unconventional watercraft that must be deemed vessels"); Arnold v. Luedtke Eng'g. Co., 196 Fed.
App'x. 331, 336 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Stewart defined Section 3 broadly .... "). Even maritime law
journals have claimed that Stewart opened the flood doors to Section 3: "Thus it seems obvious
that Stewart has substantially broadened the meaning of the term "vessel" in any maritime context
in which the pre-Stewart lower court jurisprudence had significantly restricted the term's
meaning." David W. Robertson, How the Supreme Court's New Definition of "Vessel" is
Affecting Seaman Status, Admiralty Jurisdiction, and Other Areas of Maritime Law, 39 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 115, 121 (2008).
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art expanded the definition of vessel to include more unconventional
watercrafts than we had previously thought."' 65 However, the Stewart
court did not intend to allow lower courts to drag "unconventional"
structures under admiralty jurisdiction. Rather, Stewart advocated that
"[e]ven if the general maritime law had not informed the meaning of
§ 3, its definition would not sweep within its reach an array of fixed
structures not commonly thought of as capable of being used for water
transport."16 6 By limiting vessel status to floating structures with a "real
world" practicality of water transportation, Stewart simply cannot be
considered an expansion of admiralty jurisprudence.
To address this major inconsistency in district courts' interpreta-
tions of Stewart, the Court in Lozman emphasized Stewart's adherence
to historical admiralty law to highlight the restrictive undertones of the
opinion. Lozman pointed out the various characteristics that the Super
Scoop in Stewart shared with "traditional" or "ordinary" vessels, such as
a captain, crew, navigational lights, and ballast tanks for stability.'67 By
analogizing the dredge to conventional seaworthy vessels, as understood
in the late 1800s, Lozman implicitly revealed Stewart's straightforward
application of traditional Section 3 considerations. 68 Furthermore,
Lozman addressed Stewart's thorough references to historical case law
and treatises that commonly treated dredges as vessels.1 69 This under-
scored Stewart's deference to the historical consensus in admiralty law.
By defining Stewart's accurate and fair scope, Lozman provides lower
courts with a clearer interpretation of the landmark case for future vessel
status inquiries.
There was another improper interpretation-which Lozman has
since dispelled-existing among the federal circuits regarding Stewart's
purported disapproval of the purposive test. In Belle of Orleans, an illus-
tration of a court citing Stewart to eschew a purpose or function inquiry,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "owner's intentions ... are analo-
gous to the boat's purpose, and Stewart clearly rejected any definition of
'vessel' that relied on such a purpose."' 7 ° In actuality, Stewart merely
stated that a craft practically capable of water transportation was a vessel
regardless of its primary purpose.' 7 1 Therefore, Belle of Orleans mis-
construed Stewart's disapproval of a primary purpose test as being a
165. De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 474 F.3d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 2006).
166. Stewart, 543 U.S. at 494.
167. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133 S. Ct. 735, 742 (2013).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Bd. of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist. v. MIV/BELLE OF ORLEANS, 535 F.3d 1299,
1311 (l1th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
171. Stewart, 543 U.S. at 491.
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blanket disapproval of the entire purposive test. 72
Lozman reinforced Stewart's approval of the purposive test by cit-
ing it for the conclusion that courts should not abandon all criteria that is
based on a craft's purpose when making a Section 3 vessel determina-
tion. 1 73 The majority in Lozman also used Stewart as primary support for
its conclusion that the craft's objective purpose is the proper test for
vessel determination. 74 Therefore, Lozman clarified that Stewart not
only acknowledged the existence of a purposive test, but it also utilized
the test in its own analysis of vessel status.
175
B. The Difficulties in Applying a "Reasonable Observer" Standard
Although Lozman undoubtedly cleared up any confusion in the
aftermath of Stewart, the opinion proves to add its own degree of uncer-
tainty to the vessel analysis. As the dissent in Lozman points out, the
majority's use of the term "reasonable observer" will inevitably add con-
fusion and subjectivity to the vessel standard. 176 For clarity and uniform-
ity reasons, the Court should have refrained from using a "reasonable
observer" standard and applied the traditional, objective, purposive test.
The "reasonable observer" is well-known within federal law for its
application in First Amendment Establishment Clause jurisprudence and
copyright law; both have shown to be difficult, or at least controversial,
in application.
The endorsement test for First Amendment Establishment Clause
cases, as developed by the Supreme Court, asks whether the disputed
government action has the purpose or effect of endorsing religion, mea-
sured by a "reasonable observer" standard. 177 Although simple on its
face, the scope and knowledge of the infamous "reasonable observer"
soon unveiled disagreement among the Justices.
178
172. The district court in Riviera also misread Stewart as abandoning the purpose inquiry
altogether when it concluded that Lozman's floating home was a vessel because its purpose as a
stationary residence was irrelevant. City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two-
Story Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 639 F.3d 1259, 1267 (1 1th Cir. 2011).
173. Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 744.
174. "The Court's reasoning in Stewart also supports our conclusion." Id. at 742.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 754 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
177. Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
574, 620 (1989) ("The constitutionality of [the display's] effect must be judged according to the
standard of a 'reasonable observer.' "). See Nathan P. Heller, Context is King: A Perception-Based
Test for Evaluating Government Displays of the Ten Commandments, 51 VnLE. L. REv. 379, 395
(2006) ("Acknowledgment [of religion] becomes improper when a reasonable observer would
conclude that the challenged governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of
religion, provided that the observer was aware of the secular undertones of the specific display,
the unique history of the specific display and the popular social attitudes toward religion.").
178. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778-81 (1995)
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Moreover, even individual Justices over time have shifted their
stances on who represents the "reasonable observer."' 7 9 Paula Abrams
poses additional questions regarding the First Amendment's "reasonable
observer" in her article, The Reasonable Believer: Faith, Formalism,
and Endorsement of Religion, making this vague standard even more
ambiguous: "If the perspective of the reasonable observer differs from
that of adherent and nonadherent, what is the basis for her perceptions?
Does the reasonable observer represent a compromise between the views
of adherent and nonadherent or an alternate reality?"1 80 These abstract
hypotheticals may seem to probe deeper than necessary for an objective
review, but they evidence society's reluctance to accept such an elusive
standard and the Court's inability to provide answers.
Similarly, in copyright law, federal courts have developed a "rea-
sonable observer" standard, but have not established uniform guidelines
on how to properly apply it. To make out a prima facie case of copyright
infringement, courts have developed the "reasonable observer" standard
to measure whether "substantial similarity" exists between two works of
authorship.' 8 ' This widely accepted standard articulated by Judge
Learned Hand establishes that there is "substantial similarity" between
two works where "the ordinary observer, unless set out to detect the
disparity, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic
appeal as the same."' 82 As the standard began to take shape over time,
some circuits have determined that the reasonable observer is the
intended customer base of the work in question,' 83 while others have
taken the reasonable observer to mean any layperson or spectator,
regardless of consumer status.' 84 Added difficulties then arise when the
intended customers of the litigated works are not average consumers but
rather experts in that field. Would their ability to better discern differ-
ences with their trained eye abolish the need for the reasonable observer
standard? Would it matter if the works being compared were something
(comparing Justice Stevens' belief that the reasonable observer is a nonmember of the religion in
question and has limited knowledge with Justice O'Connor's stance that the reasonable observer
has knowledge of both the display's history and tradition).
179. Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Lynch v. Donnelly implies that the reasonable observer
must adhere to the religion allegedly endorsed by the government. 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). This,
however, runs counter to her later opinion in Capitol Square where she asserts that the reasonable
observer does not encompass the perceptions of an individual but rather reflects the collective
beliefs of a political community. 515 U.S. 753, 772 (1995).
180. Paula Abrams, The Reasonable Believer: Faith, Formalism, and Endorsement of
Religion, 14 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 1537, 1544 (2010).
181. Connor Boyd, The Bratz Trap: Ownership and Infringement at the Nexus of Copyright
and Employment Law, 45 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 221, 232 (2011).
182. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
183. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 732 (4th Cir. 1990).
184. Dam Things From Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 562 (3d Cir. 2002).
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more complex, such as computer codes or internet databases? 8 5 And if
the products were children's toys, would the reasonable observer be
from the perspective of the small child who is actually utilizing the prod-
uct, or the parents who are purchasing it in the marketplace?' 86 Although
the reasonable observer was meant to implement a standard of uniform-
ity in infringement suits, copyright case law shows that courts still differ
on its application.
Based on the foregoing examples of the complexities involved in
applying the "reasonable observer" in other areas of federal law, the
Supreme Court's introduction of such an ambiguous standard in mari-
time jurisprudence triggers apprehension. Although intended to be an
objective measure, Lozman's adoption of an additional lens of analy-
sis-the perspective of a "reasonable observer"-will inevitably open Pan-
dora's box; subsequent legal questions and manipulations will thus
threaten the uniformity of federal admiralty law. Is the "reasonable
observer" of a floating structure in question one who uses it and knows
its capabilities? Or is the reasonable observer of a floating craft one who
is examining the structure for his or her first time? Because Lozman
inserted this notoriously obscure standard into vessel analysis without
precedent, the Court should have limited the analysis to a traditional
purpose/function test, forgoing any mention of the "reasonable
observer" perspective.
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF DETERMINING VESSEL STATUS
The Court in Lozman found that the physical characteristics of
Lozman's home (lack of rudder or steering mechanism, unraked bow,
flat bottom, rectangular shape, French glass doors, and windows rather
than circular portholes) served to keep the vessel analysis as objective as
possible.' 87 Although the mention of these attributes of the structure
does help support the conclusion that the floating home falls outside
Section 3, it should be emphasized that physical characteristics, viewed
by a "reasonable observer," are merely incidental considerations in the
larger purpose and/or function inquiry of a vessel. The Court rightly
decided to exclude Lozman's home from admiralty jurisdiction due in
185. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834-35 (10th Cir. 1993)
(noting that expert testimony used to inform the "reasonable observer" is helpful in cases
involving computer software); see Dawson, 905 F.2d at 735.
186. Compare Sid & Mary Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1166 (9th
Cir. 1977) (determining that the kid-friendly characters in dispute were to be analyzed for
substantial similarity from the viewpoint of a child) with Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297
F.3d 815, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (analyzing the objective themes, story line, stock characters and
scenes-a-faire of two children's books from a sophisticated perspective).
187. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133 S. Ct. 735, 744 (2013).
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part to the structure's external appearance, yet the more critical ratio-
nale, which the Court only made passing note of, lies within the purpose
and policy behind providing vessels special legal treatment.1 88 For it is
these policies serving seagoing ships that justify the necessity for a uni-
form body of federal law and reserved jurisdiction. The importance of
such maritime concerns cannot be disregarded in deciding whether to
apply the rules of the sea to the governance of one's floating home.
A. Federal Maritime Lien Act
The Federal Maritime Lien Act ("FMLA"),189 a trademark statute
in admiralty law, reveals how maritime laws function to serve the unique
policies and practicalities of seagoing vessels and how their application
to stationary structures is utterly illogical. FMLA is undoubtedly the
most crippling consequence of classifying a floating home like
Lozman's a "vessel." The act created a debt-collection regime specifi-
cally designed and tailored for vessels and their creditors. Once a busi-
ness or person provides a vessel with "necessities," such as repairs, fuel,
supplies, etc., FMLA allows for a lien to automatically attach, by opera-
tion of law, to that vessel.1 90 Subsequently, upon default, the respective
creditor has the power to unilaterally seize the collateralized vessel by
U.S. Marshals and deprive the owner of the vessel an opportunity to be
heard or even present at trial.' Furthermore, maritime liens can auto-
matically attach even if the owner of the vessel was not the one who
personally contracted to receive the "necessities."' 92
The concept of maritime liens was developed during the beginning
of the shipping industry boom. 193 Often times, vessels far from their
home ports or owners need to obtain vital repairs and supplies but do not
have the adequate funds on board. 194 With servicemen wary of unfamil-
iar ships, whose inherent mobility poses a flight risk, commerce is
188. As the Court in Evansville explicitly reasoned regarding the maritime rule of limited
liability of vessel owners, "[o]ur statutes establishing the rule were enacted to promote the
building of ships, to encourage the business of navigation, and in that respect to put this country
on the same footing with other countries. The rule should be applied having regard to the purposes
it is intended to subserve and the reasons on which it rests." Evansville & Bowling Green Packet
Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 U.S. 19, 21-22 (1926).
189. 46 U.S.C. §§ 31341-43 (2006).
190. Crimson Yachts v. Betty Lyn II Motor Yacht, 603 F.3d 864 868 (11th Cir. 2010).
191. Id. at 870. FMLA provides for an in rem action, meaning that the suit is not against the
owner of the vessel himself; rather the statute personifies the actual vessel into the named
defendant. Id.
192. 46 U.S.C. § 31341(a) (2006) establishes the creation of a maritime lien if the owner or the
master of a vessel, or a person appointed or entrusted with a vessel secures supplies for that
vessel.
193. Crimson, 603 F.3d at 871.
194. Id. at 870.
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stunted. Therefore, maritime liens encourage business transactions by
enabling seamen in command of the ship to pledge the value of the ves-
sel to its service providers.
Given its historical context, maritime lien legislation encompasses
the principle that a vessel only serves its purposes of engaging in trade
to generate profit when it is in motion. 95 Facilitating the ongoing transit
of ships between ports is thus easily accomplished by giving vessel cred-
itors the exceptional security of a maritime lien to automatically collect
bad debts.
Clearly, the reasoning and application of FMLA is only appropriate
for vessels engaged in navigation.196 But for floating structures that
remain virtually stationary, such as Lozman's home, maritime liens are
utterly inapplicable, creating a detriment to both homeowners and
creditors.
In its amicus curiae brief in support of the Petitioner, Lozman, the
Seattle Floating Homes Association noted that "the [reasoning behind
maritime liens] has no reasonable application to floating homes, which
cannot move at all without significant burden, danger, and equip-
ment."' 97 The brief further detailed that a move often involves the hiring
of several trained professionals: "Towing a floating home can be an
expensive project. A floating home owner must engage the services of a
tugboat, or another vessel with sufficient power to pull the home through
the water. There are also labor costs .... All told, moving a floating
home over a relatively short distance can cost thousands of dollars." 198
As the Court in Lozman concedes, neither Lozman nor his floating
home posed a flight risk to creditors. Moving the residence involved the
employment of not only contractors to install proper towing cleats, but
also two tugboats. The structure also suffered damage from being awk-
wardly dragged across the water. It would be virtually impossible for
Lozman to secretly "sail away" from his dockage debts in any meaning-
ful degree of discretion or speed. Therefore, the Marina did not need the
195. Raymond P. Hayden & Kipp C. Leland, The Uniqueness of Admiralty and Maritime Law:
The Unique Nature of Maritime Liens, 79 TUL. L. REv. 1227, 1233 (2005) ("The law of maritime
liens acknowledges that a vessel only makes money when it is in motion and is structured so the
vessel can do so in the short term without hindrance.").
196. The Rock Island Bridge, 73 U.S. 213, 216 (1867) ("A maritime lien can only exist upon
movable things engaged in navigation, or upon things which are the subjects of commerce on the
high seas or navigable waters."); see also Piedmont & Georges Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard
Fisheries Co., 254 U.S. 1, 9 (1920) (emphasizing the necessity for maritime liens because the
function of a vessel "is to move from place to place").
197. Brief for the Seattle Floating Homes Association and the Floating Homes Association of
Sausalito as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 31, Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133
S. Ct. 735 (2013) (No. 11-626).
198. Id. at 20.
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added security of a maritime lien; Lozman's contractual obligations and
the permanency of his residence offered the same security of payment as
any land-based mortgagor to a mortgagee or tenant to a landlord.
Beyond typical "necessities," maritime liens are also used to secure
the crew's wages.' 99 Consequently, if a floating home owner employs a
live-in maid or nanny and misses payment, that employee can bring an
in rem action against the house and win a court order to have the resi-
dence seized and sold to recover back pay. The idea of a nanny or main-
tenance-person circumventing traditional contract and tort claim
procedures to unilaterally force a sale of an employer's home was cer-
tainly not entertained during the enactment of the FMLA. Employees of
floating residences have sufficient legal remedies under state law to
reclaim what is rightfully owed without initiating federal in rem pro-
ceedings against residences.
B. Homestead Exemption Protection
Admiralty law's disregard of the sacred protection offered to homes
is a strong justification for the Lozman Court's holding that the Court
failed to address. Whereas the Marina had alternate remedies against
Lozman to receive payment or decline renewal of the lease, there was no
alternate remedy for Lozman to obtain his home once it was ordered to
be destroyed. The Seattle Floating Home Association nicely summarized
the importance of such a consideration to cases like this:
In addition to lacking any basis in the Act's purpose, allowing mari-
time liens against floating homes would undermine state interests and
violate the sanctity of the home. Floating homes, as residences,
would otherwise be protected by state homestead exemptions, which
allow individuals to protect their residences from creditors in certain
circumstances.
200
As previously mentioned, Lozman received Florida homestead exemp-
tion status on his floating home upon arriving at Riviera Beach Marina
in 2006. Florida homestead protection is a constitutionally protected
right in Florida.2 0' It is in place to ensure that homeowners and their
families, regardless of financial position, are secure in their resi-
dences.2°2 In determining homestead status of a particular dwelling,
Florida requires "actual intent to live permanently in a place, coupled
with actual use and occupancy."2 °3 Florida courts have increasingly
199. Hayden & Leland, supra note 195, at 1235.
200. Brief for the Seattle Floating Homes Association and the Floating Homes Association of
Sausalito as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 31, Lozman, 133 S. Ct. 735 (No. 11-626).
201. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see also art. VII, § 6.
202. In re Mead, 255 B.R. 80, 83 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000).
203. In re Brown, 165 B.R. 512, 514 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
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granted homestead exemptions to floating residences, relying on the
broad language of the Florida Statutes for protection against forced sales
of "any dwelling, including a mobile home used as a residence. ' 2 4
Because Lozman's unique floating home was afforded homestead
protection from the state, he carried a certain expectation that his house,
despite it being atop water, would be safe from government or creditor
meddling. Lozman's floating home was his sole and main residence; it
was listed on his driver's license and voter registration, and it served as
his primary mailing address. Riviera Beach had no justification for dis-
regarding Florida's homestead protections when it initiated proceedings
for the arrest and sale of Lozman's home for an alleged unpaid debt.
Applying maritime liens to structures that serve as a citizen's residence
subverts and dilutes the great protection the homestead exemption was
designed to provide. The importance of homestead in not only securing a
housing market, but also securing people's expectations, certainly out-
weighs any slight benefit of debt collection that FMLA adds over tradi-
tional creditor remedies.
C. Jurisdictional and Federalism Concerns
Beyond undermining Florida's homestead justification, the City's
invocation of federal jurisdiction under FMLA was a needless waste of
federal court resources. The City first brought suit against Lozman in
Florida state court under the state's landlord-tenant laws, but the City
later claimed that the suit for back dockage needed to be brought in
federal court to foreclose a maritime lien on a "vessel. 2 °5 The strategic
switch in venue after the City's state court proceeding was unsuccessful
cuts against the City's argument that federal admiralty law was its sole
remedy against Lozman.
Furthermore, bringing this issue into federal court and applying
admiralty law would jeopardize many state statutes and regulatory
204. FLA. STAT. § 222.05 (2012) (emphasis added). The court in Mead concluded that
homestead exemption statutes intended to cover all types and kinds of homes: "The legislature
obviously sought to extend the homestead protection not only to mobile homes but to other,
perhaps unforeseeable, types of living quarters." Mead, 255 B.R. at 83.
205. During oral argument, Justice Ginsberg asked City's counsel, David Frederick, if it could
have brought the action for back dockage and regulation compliance (trespass) in regular state
court. The City's attorney replied, "no." Oral Argument at 39:15, Lozman, 133 S. Ct. 735 (No. 11-
626), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012 11_626. Mr. Lozman
strongly disagrees with that answer, and for valid reasons. If the City truly believed that Lozman's
floating home constituted a "vessel," it still could have litigated the matter in state court under
Section 318.17 of the Florida Statutes, which governs the "nonjudicial sale of any vessel held for
unpaid costs, storage charges, or dockage fees." Because Florida law provides a proper remedy for
the Marina, the City's invocation of admiralty law and federal jurisdiction against the floating
home was avoidable. Lozman Interview, supra note 13.
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schemes established for floating homes. The Court in Lozman briefly
commented on the importance of maintaining and respecting state and
local regulations, noting that if floating homes were "vessels" under
Section 3, then there would be a large inconsistency in the reading of
state and local laws governing the same kinds of structures.2 ° 6 "Consis-
tency of interpretation of related state and federal laws is a virtue in that
it helps to create simplicity making the law easier to understand and to
follow for lawyers and nonlawyers alike.
20 7
However, the Court failed to thoroughly address the true implica-
tions of federal admiralty law displacing state and local regulations
regarding floating homes. The Seattle Floating Home Association
pointed to two states that have devised a comprehensive set of regula-
tions specifically for the construction and maintenance of floating
homes.2 °8 Washington's Shoreline Management Act requires floating
homes to follow the land building code for the safety of the residents
and integrity of the structure itself.2" The building code also calls for
certain location, height, square footage, access points, and dockage
space restrictions for floating homes, all serving the aesthetic goals of
the state.210
Similarly, in Sausalito, California, floating home owners are sub-
jected to an extensive local code that dictates maximum dimensions of
homes,211 length and type of water hose use,212 electrical restrictions,21 3
stability levels,214 and presence of life saving equipment.21521 6 Local
regulations also include oversight of the marinas that harbor floating
homes, requiring marinas to maintain certain distances between the
floating residences and to keep a specific vessel-per-acre density.217 The
state of California, on a state level, has also taken action to protect the
special relationship specifically between floating home owners and
tenants.21 8
206. Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 744.
207. Id.
208. Brief for the Seattle Floating Homes Association and the Floating Homes Association of
Sausalito as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 23, Lozman, 133 S. Ct. 735 (No. 11-626).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 25.
211. Marin County Code § 19.18.050-51.
212. MARIN CNTy., CAL., BLDG. CODE § 19.18.150 (2010).
213. MARIN CNTY., CAL., BLDG. CODE § 19.18.290 (2010).
214. MARIN CNTY., CAL., BLDG. CODE § 19.18.320 (2010).
215. MARIN CNTY., CAL., BLDG. CODE § 19.18.350.36 (2010).
216. Brief for the Seattle Floating Homes Association and the Floating Homes Association of
Sausalito as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 27, Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133
S. Ct. 735 (2013) (No. 11-626).
217. MARIN CNTY., CAL., BLDG. CODE § 22.32.101(C) (2010).
218. Floating Home Residency Law, CAL. CIv. CODE § 800.20-.26 (2012).
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State and local representatives base floating home codes on the
degree of urbanization, resources, demographic of residents, availability
of the courts, and specific weather, and safety implications that their
particular state faces.219 The individual states, not broad federal admi-
ralty laws, are in the best position to know the particularized nuances of
floating home living. Thus, localized regulations efficiently serve the
needs of those owning, harboring, and constructing such structures.
There is no substitute in federal admiralty statutes for the kind of
detailed attention states are providing to floating homes; therefore, it
follows that any decision tending to incorporate floating homes into fed-
eral jurisdiction will serve an injustice to the states' best determinations.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Lozman case is a fundamental addition to the body of admi-
ralty jurisprudence. By dissecting the bedrock maritime cases from early
decisions such as Evansville to more modem decisions like Stewart, the
Court gave a well-rounded and practical opinion for courts to apply in
future cases where vessel status falls in murky water. Despite the poten-
tially problematic "reasonable observer" standard Lozman added into
maritime law, lower courts now have clearer guidance on their vessel
status analysis. In taking a more narrow view of Section 3 than its plain
language suggests, the Court stayed true to the common law principle
that the purpose and function of a vessel are determinative considera-
tions. And although the Court in Lozman did not provide a thorough
discussion of the policy underlying admiralty law, its final ruling reflects
those important societal implications of preempting state laws.
With the increased popularity of floating casinos, hotels, and res-
taurants, Lozman now gives owners of modem floating structures a
stronger sense of predictability and comfort for future endeavors. Float-
ing home owners can put full trust into their states to create and enforce
a localized statutory regime without the unnecessary worry of being
swept into federal regulation and jurisdiction. As such, the Coast Guard
and the federal judiciary can be relieved from micromanaging local dis-
putes over stationary structures on water and instead focus on national
security, uniform maritime trade, and efficient commerce, which are the
core reasons for admiralty law in the first place.
219. Brief of Maritime Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15, Lozman,
133 S. Ct. 735 (No. 11-626).
